PUBLIC UTILITY DISCONTINUANCE
AND THE RESIDENTIAL LEASE:
PROVIDING A REMEDY
FOR THE RESIDENTIAL TENANT'S
RIGHT TO SERVICE

THE PROBLEM

For tenants in residential dwellings a deficiency in the law exists
today in the important area of utility service. A tenant in a threefamily, non-owner-occupied building,' for example, whose landlord
is obligated to pay for utility service, can be denied that service
because the landlord defaults in the bill even though the tenant is
current with the rent. When this tenant contacts the utility company
after the service has been discontinued, he finds that he can have the
service restored only if he pays the landlord's outstanding bill, 2 a
figure most likely beyond his resources. The problem this tenant
faces is how, within the law, to have utility service restored as rapidly
as possible so as to prevent injury to himself and his family.
In a jurisdiction such as New Jersey, which has manifested a
sensitivity to the plight of tenants, remedies appear to abound in
favor of a tenant who is not receiving what he has contracted for. It is
clear that under the decision in Marini v. Ireland,' certain covenants in a lease are mutually dependent. Thus, the tenant is excused
from paying rent if the landlord fails in his responsibility to provide
habitable living quarters. 4 As viewed by the Marini court, however,

' For some reason, there exists, in the sphere of landlord-tenant law, a great deal of
distinction between buildings which are owner occupied and have two or less rental units
and all other residential apartments. For example, the recent amendments to the summary
dispossess statute, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-53 (Supp. 1975-76), called by some the tenants'
bill of rights, are applicable for apartments "other than owner-occupied premises with not
more than two rental units." Id. § 2A:18-61.1. Likewise, in a rent control situation, the
Newark rent control law, providing for a maximum yearly rental increase of no more than
5%, except where hardship is shown, is not applicable to "owner occupied two and three
family housing space units." NEWARK, N.J., REV. ORDINANCES § 15:9B-2(b) (Supp. 1974).
2 The utility cannot, however, require a tenant to pay the back bills if that tenant did
not live in the premises during the period for which the bill accrued. See N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 48:3-3.1 (1969).
3 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970).
4 Id. at 145-46, 265 A.2d at 534-35. The court indicated that, by letting the premises, the
landlord impliedly covenants that the
facilities will remain in usable condition during the entire term of the lease. In
performance of this covenant the landlord is required to maintain those facilities in
a condition which renders the property livable.
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the tenant's remedies were limited to either making the repairs and
deducting the cost from the succeeding month's rent or moving out
of the apartment under the theory of constructive eviction.5 Since
Marini, tenant remedies have been extended by lower courts to allow
for rent abatements, especially in those situations where a tenant
could not possibly afford the repair costs. 6 Even if the tenant is

allowed to withhold rent under the abatement theory, this remedy
will not provide immediate restoration of essential services such as
heat and electricity.
In 1973, the NewJersey supreme court again extended a tenant's
available remedies by providing that a tenant, whose premises
were uninhabitable, could bring affirmative action against the landlord. 7 In Berzito v. Gambino,' the court permitted an assessment of
Id. at 144,265 A.2d at 534. Thus, in a situation where the landlord failed to act after reasonable
notice and the tenant repaired a toilet and deducted the cost from her rent, the court allowed
the remedy of repair and offset. Id. at 146-47, 265 A.2d at 535.
The problem, of course, arises as to defining the word "habitable." In Academy Spires, Inc.
v. Jones, 108 N.J. Super. 395, 403, 261 A.2d 413, 417 (L. Div. 1970), the court, while not
defining the word, did indicate that "[niot every transient inconvenience of living attributable to
the condition of the premises will be a legitimate subject of litigation." In Berzito v. Gambino, 63
N.J. 460, 469, 308 A.2d 17, 22 (1973), the supreme court provided a more definite standard:
Not every defect or inconvenience will be deemed to constitute a breach of the
covenant of habitability. The condition complained of must be such as truly to
render the premises uninhabitable in the eyes of a reasonable person.
Some jurisdictions have adopted the local housing code as the basis of the standard of
habitability. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1072-73, 1081-82
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); Steele v. Latimer, 214 Kan. 329, 336, 521 P.2d 304,
309-10 (1974). Other jurisdictions use an approximation of the housing code. See Green v.
Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 637, 517 P.2d 1168,
1183, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704, 719 (1974) ("substantial compliance with those applicable building
and housing code standards which materially affect health and safety'); Jack Spring, Inc. v.
Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 366, 280 N.E.2d 208, 217 (1972) (habitability "is fulfilled by substantial
compliance with the pertinent provisions of the . . . building code').
5 56 N.J. at 146-47, 265 A.2d at 535. The remedy of constructive eviction suggested by
the court reaffirmed a remedy first enunciated in Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444,
251 A.2d 268 (1969). The problem with constructive eviction, however, is that a tenant must
have a place to move. As has been suggested by a number of courts, finding a new place may
be difficult in light of critical housing shortages which exist throughout the state. See
Samuelson v. Quinones, 119 N.J. Super. 338, 343, 291 A.2d 580, 583 (App. Div. 1972);
Inganamort v. Borough of Fort Lee, 120 N.J. Super. 286, 318, 293 A.2d 720, 737-38 (L. Div.
1972), modified, 62 N.J. 521, 303 A.2d 298 (1973); Academy Spires, Inc. v. Brown, I l N.J.
Super. 477, 480, 268 A.2d 556, 558 (Essex County Dist. Ct. 1970).
6 In Academy Spires, Inc. v. Brown, Ill N.J. Super. 477, 483, 268 A.2d 556, 559-60
(Essex County Dist. Ct. 1970), the court held that a tenant was not restricted in his remedies
to either moving out or fixing the repair. The case involved the malfunctioning of the
heating system, as well as other vital services, in a 400-unit apartment, the court indicating
that it was unreasonable to expect the tenant to undertake repairs in a building of that size.
Id. at 484, 268 A.2d at 560. Rather, the court allowed the remedy of rent abatement. See id.
' Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 469, 308 A.2d 17, 22 (1973).
8 63 N.J. 460, 308 A.2d 17 (1973).
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money damages based upon the rent paid less the rental value of the
apartment as it existed with the habitability defects. 9 In so doing, the
Berzito court effectively expanded the tenant's available remedies for
enforcement of the covenant of habitability:
We now hold that the covenant on the part of a tenant to pay
rent, and the covenant.., on the part of a landlord to maintain the
demised premises in a habitable condition are for all purposes
mutually dependent. 10
While Berzito marks a significant advancement for the tenant, like
Marini and its progeny it offers no effective recourse to a tenant who
seeks immediate restoration of utility service.
An additional remedy, provided by the New Jersey legislature,"
permits the tenant, by petition, to allege specific defects of habitability
and to request the appointment of a rent receiver whose duty would
2
be to collect the rents and to insure that necessary repairs are made. '
In cases of utility termination, this remedy is not immediately effective since payment to the utility company is dependent upon the
receiver's ability to secure rental payments. In the interim, however,
the tenant is still without service.
On the municipal level, a tenant can pursue a derivative action
through the local board of health's housing code enforcement process. As the local repository of the state's police power jurisdiction in
matters of health, the municipal board of health is an agent of the
state, not the municipality.' 3 Thus, despite the fact that the munici9 Id. at 469, 308 A.2d at 22. The court also noted that, while not applicable to the
instant case because it was effective after the commencement of the action, the state
legislature had authorized affirmative action by the tenant. Id. at 471-72, 308 A.2d at 23
(citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:42-85 et seq. (Supp. 1975-76)). For a further discussion of this
statute see notes 11-12 infra and accompanying text.
'0 63 N.J. at 469, 308 A.2d at 21.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:42-85 etseq. (Supp. 1975-76).
12 The legislative findings indicate that the purpose of the statute is to encourage
owners of substandard dwellings "to provide safe and sanitary housing accommodations for
the public," thereby assuring the health, safety, and welfare of each inhabitant. Id. § 2A:4285(b).
''
As stated by Chief Justice Vanderbilt in Zullo v. Board of Health, 9 N.J. 431, 435, 88
A.2d 625, 627 (1952):
Local boards of health are governmental agencies created in every municipality
under statutory mandate . . . for the purpose of exercising locally the inherent police
powers of the state with respect to matters pertaining to public health.
(Citation omitted) (emphasis added). See also Itzen & Robertson, Inc. v. Board of Health, 89 N.J.
Super. 374, 379, 215 A.2d 60, 63 (L. Div. 1965), affd, 92 N.J. Super. 241, 222 A.2d 769 (App.
Div. 1966); Grosso v. City of Paterson, 55 N.J. Super. 164, 170-72, 150 A.2d 94, 97-99 (L. Div.
1959).
Thus, even though boards of health are "'established in and by cities,'" and even
though the municipality determines both the membership and the budget of the local board,
it is not a creation of the municipality. Grosso v. City of Paterson, supra at 173, 150 A.2d at
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pality adopts ordinances governing certain housing standards,' 4 it
does so under the aegis of a grant of power from the state.' 5 Likewise,
the state, not the municipality, prescribes the sanctions imposed for
housing code violations.16 In New Jersey, those sanctions are limited
to a fine for such a violation, and imprisonment for failure to pay the
fine. 7 Thus, even a rigorous and effective code enforcement process,
something several commentators maintain is virtually impossible,",
may fail to afford a remedy which inures to the benefit of the tenant.
Instead, it results only in revenue to the locality. Barring code enforcement, the only other municipal remedy, total condemnation, is
also clearly ineffective from the tenant's standpoint. Also authorized
by the state, condemnation is permitted when a building is deemed
unfit for human habitation.., due to other conditions rendering
such building... unsafe or insanitary, or dangerous or detrimental
to the health or safety ...

of the residents .... 19

The final remedy which might be available to a tenant is a suit in
equity to restrain the landlord from interfering with the use and
enjoyment of the apartment. 20 If the landlord is poor or simply does
99 (quoting from Board of Health v. New York & L.B.R.R., 77 N.J.L. 15, 16, 71 A. 259, 259
(Sup. Ct. 1908)).
'4 See, e.g., NEWARK, N.J., REV. ORDINANCES § 15:1-1 et seq. (1966).
's N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:3-1 (1964) provides in pertinent part that "[t]here shall be a
board of health in every municipality in this State."
16 See id. §§ 26:3-70 to -70.1 (Supp. 1975-76); id. §§ 26:3-71 to -82 (1964).
IId. § 26:3-70 (Supp. 1975-76); id. § 26:3-77 (1964). Both of these provisions are
adopted into the Newark Housing Code. See NEWARK, N.J., REV. ORDINANCES § 15:2-7
(Supp. 1974).
11 In 1973, a congressional hearing indicated that a "criticism of housing codes concerns
the way in which they are enforced." Hearings before the Subcomm. on Housing of the House Comm.
on Bank. and Curr., 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 2222 (1973). In 1971, an article written by a University of Pennsylvania law professor indicated that even the policy makers who draft and
implement housing codes "are not convinced that strict enforcement of even an ideal code will
really benefit the tenants whom the code is intended to 'protect.' " Ackerman, RegulatingSlum
Housing Markets on Behalfof the Poor:Of Housing Code, HousingSubsidies and Income Redistribution
Policy, 80 YALE L.J. 1093, 1095 (1971).
19 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:48-2.3 (1967). If a tenant is forced to move by this process, he
qualifies as a displaced person under the Relocation Assistance Act. Id. § 20:4-1 et seq. (Supp.
1975-76). The tenant, under that Act, would be entitled to certain assistance including moving
and related expenses, and, possibly, an actual housing allowance. See id. § 20:4-4, -6.
20 The covenant of quiet enjoyment
is not an absolute covenant for the protection of [the lessee's] possession against the
acts of the whole world. It extends only to the acts of the landlord and of strangers
asserting a paramount title. The lessor does not warrant against the acts of strangers
who do not claim a superior tide. But in order that his own acts may constitute a breach
of the covenant, they must amount to an eviction ....
When the covenant of quiet
enjoyment is broken, the obligation for payment of rent is suspended ....
C. TIEDEMAN, THE AMERICAN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 144, at 183-84 (4th ed. 1924) (footnotes
omitted).
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not have the money to pay the utility, due perhaps to rising fuel
prices, it is possible that while the suit would lie, enforcement of the
21
restraining order would be impossible.
Thus, despite the statutes and ordinances that compel a landlord
to supply heat 2 2 and hot water,2 3 there exists no remedy that ensures
restoration of utility services shut off because of the landlord's delinquency. For any such remedy to be fully effective, it should work not
only against the landlord, but also against the utility to prevent it
from initially discontinuing service.
POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

The Due Process Clause

As a general proposition it has been suggested that no public
utility should be allowed to discontinue service to its customer without
affording the procedural due process requirements of notice and
the opportunity to be heard.2 4 Before the safeguards can be judicially
mandated in utility discontinuation cases, as in other cases, it must be
I1 In a recent case,Jones v. Buford, Civ. No. L- 10159-74 (N.J. Super. Ct., L. Div., Nov. 22,
1974), rev'd, 132 N.J. Super. 209,333 A.2d 279 (App. Div. 1975), the trial court considered the
applicability of an action in chancery by a tenant against a poor landlord, the court saying: "The
record will reflect that after listening to the owner, even a suit in Chancery would be an effort in
futility." Transcript at 20,Jones v. Buford, Civ. No. L-10159-74 (N.J. Super. Ct., L. Div., Nov.
22, 1974).
22 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:3-31 (Supp. 1975-76), gives the local board of health the power to
enact regulations to require a landlord to supply heat between October 1and May 1 at a level of
68 degrees during the day whenever the outside temperature falls below 55 and at a level of 55
degrees at night whenever the temperature falls below 40. Id. § 26:3-31 m. The city of Newark
also has an ordinance compelling a similar standard. See NEWARK, N.J., REV. ORDINANCES §
15:4-14(c) (Supp. 1973).
23 See, e.g., NEWARK, N.J., REV. ORDINANCES § 15:4-17 (1966) which provides:
Hot water shall be supplied at all times. . . at a temperature of not less than 120
degrees Fahrenheit, between the hours of 6:00 A.M. and 10:00 P.M.
24 Cases finding that due process is required include: Palmer v. Columbia Gas, 479 F.2d
153, 165-68 (6th Cir. 1973); Ihrke v. Northern States Power Co., 459 F.2d 566, 568, 570 (8th
Cir.), vacated as moot, 409 U.S. 815 (1972); Hattell v. Public Serv. Co., 350 F. Supp. 240, 245-46
(D. Colo. 1972); Bronson v. Consolidated Edison Co., 350 F. Supp. 443,447 (S.D.N.Y. 1972);
Stanford v, Gas Serv. Co., 346 F. Supp. 717, 722 (D. Kan. 1972).
Contra, Kadlec v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 407 F.2d 624,627(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 846
(1969) (affirming a dismissal of suit for damages).
These cases were all brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). However, in such cases,
'under color' of law has consistently been treated as the same thing as the 'state action' required
under the Fourteenth Amendment." United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966). See
also Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 & n.7 (1970).
See generally Note, Fourteenth Amendment Due Process in Terminations of Utility Services for
Nonpayment, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1477 (1973); Note, Light a Candle and Callan Attorney-The Utility
Shutoff Cases, 58 IowA L. REv. 1161 (1973); Note, ConstitutionalSafeguardsfor Public Utility
Customers: Power to the People, 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 493 (1973).
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established that the offensive conduct constitutes state action. 25 In
1974, the Supreme Court confronted this issue inJackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co. 2 6 and held that there was no state action when a public
utility, privately owned, discontinued service to a defaulting customer. 2 7 Consequently, if the residential tenant is to have a due
process remedy, it must be compatible with Jackson.
In Jackson, a Pennsylvania utility, without notice or hearing,
discontinued service to the family home of the customer because of a
default in payments. 28 The utility, though privately owned and oper" See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 171-79 (1972) (no state action); Burton
v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722-26 (1961) (state action); Civil Rights Cases,
109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883).
26 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
27 Id.

at 358-59.

Prior to the Jackson case, the lower court cases were split on whether due process was
involved in utility termination. Most of these cases conflicted on state action grounds.
One of the first cases, according to one commentator, to hold that there was state action in a
private utility situation was Ihrke v. Northern States Power Co., 459 F.2d 566 (8th Cir.), vacated
as moot, 409 U.S. 815 (1972). See Haydock, Public Utilities and State Action: The Beginning of
ConstitutionalRestraints, 49 DENVER L.J. 413, 413 (1973).
Prior to Ihrke, the Seventh Circuit had found no state action in a case where utility service
was discontinued pursuant to a tariff which the utility had filed with the state commerce
commission. See Kadlec v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 407 F.2d 624, 625 n.1, 627 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 846 (1969). Compare id. with the rationale used by the Supreme Court in Jackson, 419
U.S. at 358. In a concurring opinion, Judge Kerner in Kadlec indicated several factors which
should be considered in a determination of state action in a utility case:
Some of the factors which should be considered are whether 1) the entity is subject to
close regulation by a statutorily-created body (such as the Illinois Commerce Commission), 2) the regulations filed with the regulatory body are required to be filed as a
condition of the entity's operation, 3) the regulations must be approved by the regulatory body to be effective, 4) the entity is given a total or partial monopoly by the
regulatory body, 5) the regulatory body controls the rates charged and/or specific
services offered by the entity, 6) the actions of the entity are subject to review by the
regulatory body, and 7) the regulation permits the entity to perform acts which it may
not otherwise perform without violating state law.
407 F.2d at 628 (Kerner, J., concurring). Compareid. with notes 41-49 infra and accompanying
text (discussing the regulations as they exist in New Jersey).
Relying on these seven factors, the Eighth Circuit decided lhrke, a situation in which
delinquent customers had their utility service discontinued without notice or hearing. 459 F.2d
at 567-69. The court found that, under these factors, there was sufficient regulation by a city to
bring the acts of the utility under color of state action. See id. at 569-70.
In addition to thelhrke decision, two federal district courts had held the activities of a public
utility to be state action. See Stanford v. Gas Serv. Co., 346 F. Supp. 717, 722 (D. Kan. 1972);
Palmer v. Columbia Gas Co., 342 F. Supp. 241, 246 (N.D. Ohio 1972). For a discussion of the
due process aspects of utility termination see Note, The Emerging Constitutional Issues in Public
Utility Consumer Law, 24 U. FLA. L. REV. 744, 755-59 (1972).
While not relying on constitutional issues, another federal district court required the city of
Washington, D.C., to provide free utility service to poor tenants whose landlord had defaulted
in payment, at least until the tenants were relocated. See Masszonia v. Washington, 315 F.
Supp. 529, 530, 533 (D.D.C. 1970).
28 419 U.S. at 347-48. There was also a question as to whether or not the meter was
intentionally damaged. Id. at 347.
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ated, was heavily regulated by the state.2 9 The utility submitted the
procedure for discontinuance as part of a general tariff. That procedure became effective because the state public utility commission had
failed to disapprove.3 0 The discontinuance was challenged on federal
due process grounds, the customer alleging that the utility's
monopolistic status, its essential service nature, the public interest
function of the utility, and the substantial state regulation provided
sufficient state involvement to give the termination procedure constitutional magnitude. 3 1 In framing the standard of state action in
terms of both Burton v. Wilmington ParkingAuthority, 32 in which the
Court had found state action in the case of a privately operated
cafeteria, leased from the state and located within a state parking
garage,33 and Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 34 in which no state action
35
was found in the state's granting a liquor license to a private club,
the Court perceived the issue inJackson as essentially whether "this
case should fall on the Burton side of the line ...rather than on the

Moose Lodge side of that line."' 36 Rejecting all of the state action
29

Id. at 350.

10 Id. at 354-55. The commission had held hearings on certain provisions of the general
tariff, (for example, rates) but it had never specifically dealt with the termination procedure provision. Id.
31 Id. at 351-54.
32 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
33 Id. at 716, 725-26.
3- 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
35 Id. at 171, 177.
36 419 U.S. at 351. For the relevant discussion of both Burton and Moose Lodge in Jackson see id. at 351-52, 357-58.
Burton involved a privately owned restaurant leased from and located within a parking
facility owned and operated by a state agency. 365 U.S. at 716. The Authority was created by
statute. Id. at 717. It had the power to construct parking facilities or to acquire property "by
lease, purchase or condemnation," to lease some of its space for commercial purposes, and to
issue tax exempt revenue bonds. Id. at 718. The Authority's property was exempt from state
taxes. Id. The restaurant leased internal space from the Authority but did not have an entrance
way connected to the parking facility. Additionally, the Authority installed certain necessary
fixtures and some " 'decorative finishing.' " Id. at 719. Also, any restaurant improvements
attached to the Authority property were tax exempt. Id. Further, the Authority covenanted to
provide heat and gas and to make structural repairs. Id. at 720.
The Burton Court, realizing that state action was not susceptible of concrete definition,
stated that "[o]nly by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious involvement
of the State in private conduct be attributed its true significance." Id. at 722. Furthermore, the
Court examined all facts and their interrelationships and their cumulative effect to arrive at its
holding:
Addition of all these activities, obligations and responsibilities of the Authority,
the benefits mutually conferred, together with the obvious fact that the restaurant is
operated as an integral part of a public building devoted to a public parking service,
indicates that degree of state participation and involvement in discriminatory action
which it was the design of the Fourteenth Amendment to condemn.... The State has
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arguments, the Court found that the utility was merely heavily regulated and partially monopolistic. 37 Additionally, the Court determined that the manner of termination of services had been
"elected" by the utility and only permitted by the public utilities
commission. 3 As a result, the Court concluded that the state was
not sufficiently connected with respondent's action in terminating
petitioner's service so as to make respondent's conduct in so doing
attributable
to the State for purposes of the Fourteenth Amend39
ment.

As a result of Jackson, then, if a privately owned public utility
submits a regulation allowing discontinuance without notice and
hearing as part of its tariff, this action falls "on the Moose Lodge side of
that line."'40 For the residential tenant, the test of state action will
revolve around the powers, duties, and regulations of the public
utility. If the utility is privately owned and the regulations allowing
discontinuance are proffered by the utility, then, under Jackson,
state action probably does not exist.
Not all states function as does Pennsylvania. In New Jersey,
control of public utilities is exercised by the Department of Public
Utilities, a principal department of the state's executive branch of
government. 4 1 State regulation of utilities has been the outgrowth of
changing society:
[D]uring the present generation, people have largely ceased supso far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with [the restaurant] that it
must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity ....
Id. at 724-25.
On the other hand, in Moose Lodge, the state involvement was not considered sufficient to
pass the private action across the threshold into state action. The Moose lodge was "a private
club in the ordinary meaning of that term." 407 U.S. at 171. The club owned its own building
and did not receive any public monies. Id. Nor did the club perform the type of function that a
state would perform if the club did not exist. Id. at 175. The club, however, did have a state
liquor license and was required to fulfill certain conditions to attain and keep this club license,
such regulations being enforced by a state agency. Id. at 176. But the Court held that the
regulation by the state did not "make the State in any realistic sense a partner or even a joint
venturer in the club's enterprise," hence the state was "not sufficiently implicate[d]" in the club's
discriminatory practices to warrant a finding of state action. Id. at 177. And there was nothing
similar to the "symbiotic relationship" that existed in Burton. Id. at 175.
31 419 U.S. at 358.
38 Id.

39 Id. at 358-59.

10 Id. at 351.
4 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48:2-1 (Supp. 1975-76) provides in part:
There is hereby established in the Executive Branch of the State Government a
principal department which shall be known as the Department of Public Utilities. The
Board of Public Utility Commissioners ...is designated the head of such principal
department.
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plying their own water and light, and these essential needs of life
have been furnished by public service corporations ....
This service
furnished by public utilities is of such importance to the public that
the states usually assumejurisdiction over service matters. Jurisdiction may be exercised by direct legislation, or more often through a
Commission. It seems to be an established rule that service may be
regulated. A company
accepting a charter from the state consents
42
to regulation.

Regulation in New Jersey is effected through a board of public
utility commissioners. 4 3 The board, composed of three citizens,
each of whom serves a six-year term, is appointed by the governor
with the advice and consent of the state senate. 44 The grant of
power to the board gives it preeminent regulatory and supervisory

control of public utilities, "their property, property rights, equipment, facilities and franchises," to the extent necessary to carry out

the purposes of the act.4 5 Under this statutory grant, the board
proposes regulations which become part of the New Jersey Administrative Code,4 6 and are thus binding on public utilities. One
of these regulations provides that there can be discontinuation of
service only after notice to the customer of the intent to discon-

tinue, 47 and then only for "[nionpayment of a valid bill due for
service furnished at a present or previous location. ' 48 The procedure in New Jersey, then, is a three step process involving: first, a
failure to pay; second, a notice to the customer of an intent to
discontinue; and third, discontinuance.
Because the board of public utility commissioners, an adjunct

of the executive, has enacted these regulations, it would seem that
this situation is distinguishable fromJackson, wherein the utility itself
submitted the shut-off procedure and the Board tacitly approved.
42

E.

41

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48:2-1 (Supp. 1975-76).

NICHOLS,

PUBLIC UTILITY SERVICE AND DISCRIMINATION 1 (1928)

(footnotes omitted).

Id. Further, no more than two persons may be of the same political party. Id.
Id. § 48:2-13. "Public utility" is defined to
include every individual, copartnership, association, corporation or joint stock company, their lessees, trustees or receivers appointed by any court whatsoever, their
successors, heirs or assigns, that now or hereafter may own, operate, manage or
control within this State any railroad, street railway, traction railway, autobus ....
canal, express, subway, pipeline, gas, electric light, heat, power, water, oil, sewer ....
telephone or telegraph system, plant or equipmentfor public use, under privileges
granted or hereafter to be granted by this State or by any political subdivision thereof.
Id. (emphasis added).
41 See N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 14:3-3.6 et seq. (1973) for those regulations relating to discontinuance of service. The board's authority is pursuant to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48:2-12 (1969).
See N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 14:3-7.12 which provides in part:
A public utility may discontinue service for nonpayment of bills provided it gives the
customer at least seven days' written notice of its intention to discontinue.
48 Id. § 14:3-3.6(a)(3)(i).
44
41
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Based on this distinction, it can be argued that, in New Jersey, state
action is present. This conclusion is reinforced by the regulation
which requires notice to the customer. 49 This notice, however,
which goes only to the customer and not the tenant, is only of the
intent to discontinue and thus comes too late to effectuate procedural due process for the tenant, who is unaware of the landlord's default and who is helpless to prevent the termination.
For due process to apply to the tenant, once state action is
found to
be present, the tenant must show that he is deprived of a
"right."5 0 In a tenancy situation, this right could devolve first from
the fact that "[a] landlord and tenant have separate and distinct
estates in the demised lands.

'5 1

As a result, during the term of the

tenancy, "It]he law regards a lease as the equivalent of a sale of
premises for the term.

' 52

Thus, a tenant has a property right as a

leaseholder.
A tenant involved in a utility shut-off situation may also have a
contract right which deserves protection-the rights of a thirdparty beneficiary to the contract between the utility and the landlord. In New Jersey, these rights are guaranteed by statute:
A person for whose benefit a contract is made .. .may sue

thereon in any court and may use such contract as a matter of
defense in an action against him although
the consideration of
53
the contract did not move from him.

Because the key phrase of the statute is "for whose benefit," in an
action by a supposed third-party beneficiary, the court must determine if the contract between promisor and promisee was for the
benefit of the third party. "[T]he real test," as stated by the court in
Borough of Brooklawn v. Brooklawn Housing Corp.,5 4 "is whether the
contracting parties intended that a third party should receive a
benefit which might be enforced in the courts. 5 5
In Brooklawn, the housing corporation had contracted with the
Id. § 14:3-7.12.
I'
0 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 & n.8 (1970).
51 Hudson Transit Corp. v. Antonucci, 137 N.J.L. 704, 707, 61 A.2d 180, 182-83 (Ct. Err.
& App. 1948).
52 Longi v. Raymond-Commerce Corp., 34 N.J. Super. 593, 600, 113 A.2d 69, 72 (App.
Div. 1955).
53 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-2 (1952).
54 124 N.J.L. 73, I1 A.2d 83 (Ct. Err. & App. 1940).
11 Id. at 77, I1A.2d at 85. See also Graybar Elec. Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 50 N.J. Super.
289, 294-95, 142 A.2d 114, 17 (App. Div. 1958), wherein the court, citingBrooklawn, indicated:
The primary concern in ascertaining the rights of third-party beneficiaries is to
discover the intention of the parties to the contract out of which the alleged rights
emanate.
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United States to purchase specified properties. 5 6 The corporation, as
part of the contract, agreed to pay all municipal assessments to the
borough. 57 Although the contract was performed, the corporation
failed to pay the assessments and the borough brought suit under the
contract as a third-party beneficiary. 58 The court indicated that the
only means of determining whether the contract was designed to
benefit the borough was to examine the intentions of the contracting
59
parties:
They are the persons who agree upon the promises, the covenants, the guarantees; they are the persons who
create the rights
6°
and obligations which flow from the contract.
While the Brooklawn court indicated that the designation of the third
party in the contract was evidence of an intention to confer a benefit, 61 it concluded that the borough could not maintain the suit

because the contract specifically gave the United States the exclusive
control for enforcement.

62

More recently, the third-party beneficiary doctrine has been
applied to a leasehold situation in Moorestown Management, Inc. v.
Moorestown Bookshop, Inc., 63 in which the landlord of a shopping mall

sued some of the tenants to enforce certain lease provisions. 6 4 The
Moorestown Mall Merchants Association (Association) also joined as
a party plaintiff, claiming as a third-party beneficiary. 65 One of the
lease clauses required the tenants tojoin the Association. 66 The court
indicated that the Association would qualify as a third-party beneficiary if it could "prove that the contract was made and intended
for" it.6 7 The underlying rationale for permitting such a party to
maintain an action once such proof is established is that
56 124 N.J.L. at 74, 11 A.2d at 84.
57 Id.

"I Id. at 74-75, 11 A.2d at 84.
19 Id. at 76-77, 11 A.2d at 85.
60 Id. Accord, Graybar Elec. Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 50 N.J. Super. 289, 294, 142 A.2d
114, 117 (App. Div. 1958).
61 124 N.J.L. at 77, 11 A.2d at 85.
e2 Id. The general rule from.Brooklawn, however, is that a third-party beneficiary can
maintain a suit. That this can be done, even though no consideration flowed from the third
party to the promisee, has been the law in New Jersey for some time. For two representative
cases see Burlew v. Hillman, 16 N.J. Eq. 23, 25 (Ch. 1863) ("a party beneficially interested in a
contract may maintain a suit in equity"); Van Dyne v. Vreeland, II N.J. Eq. 370, 379 (Ch. 1857)
("[tihe party for whose benefit the agreement is to be performed... has the legal right to enforce
it").
63 104 N.J. Super. 250, 249 A.2d 623 (Ch. 1969).
64 Id. at 254-56, 249 A.2d at 626.
65 Id. at 255, 257, 249 A.2d at 626-27.
66 Id. at 255-57, 249 A.2d at 626-27.
87 Id. at 258, 249 A.2d at 628. In this case, the court found the association to be a "donee"
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he has a sufficient interest in the enforcement of the promise so as
to entitle him to sue for damages or to invoke the aid of a court of
equity if the remedy at law is inadequate."'
When these principles of intent are applied to the landlordutility contract, it would seem clear that a landlord intends to confer
upon the tenant the rights of a third-party beneficiary. In return for
the execution of the lease, the landlord agrees to contract with the
utility for the benefit of the tenant. As the Moorestown court indicated,
the contract is "in satisfaction of a. .. duty or obligation owed by the
[landlord]. 69 Thus, if the utility discontinues service, it has breached
the contractual provision designed to benefit the third-party tenant.
Regardless of whether the proprietary or contractual rationale
is used, it seems that "utility service is an interest of sufficient worth
70
to require due process protection.
The Iproblem in a tenancy situation, however, is whether notice
would serve any useful purpose. The utility of notice to the tenant
was considered by a federal district court in Davis v. Weir,7' which
involved the discontinuance of water service by a municipality. In
Davis, a lease provided that the landlord would supply water at no
extra charge to the tenant. 72 When the landlord refused to pay the
bill, the municipality discontinued the service and the tenant
sought to restrain the city from further discontinuance. 73 While the
court would require notice of the proposed shut-off, it rejected the
idea that any due process rights of the tenant were violated by the
utility's failure to offer him the opportunity to be heard, since none of
the parties ever claimed that the tenant was liable for the water
charges. As a result, a hearing would serve no purpose.7 4 The Davis
beneficiary. Id. While it could be argued that, in a tenancy, the tenant is a "creditor" beneficiary,
the same standard of proof as used in Moorestown would apply. See id.
68 Id. The court then discussed the benefit conferred upon the Association and concluded
that the Association was a third-party beneficiary and could join as a plaintiff:
In this case the promisee, Moorestown, expresses a clear intention and purpose... to
confer a benefit upon [the] Association ....Accordingly, the Association as a donee
beneficiary has a sufficient interest in the enforcement of these covenants and is a
proper party to this action.
Id.
69

Id.

" Note, The EmergingConstitutionalIssues in Public Utility Consumer Law, 24 U. FLA. L. REv.
744, 755 (1972). This comment compares utility service to wages and welfare payments in terms
of protectible interests. Id. at 747.
" 328 F. Supp. 317 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
72 Id. at 318.
73 Id.
11 Id. at 322. The court noted that the city's procedure effectively "terminate[d] an
important benefit ...without notice to the person who is the actual recipient of that benefit." Id.
at 321-22.
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court thus held that a utility must give notice to a tenant before his
service may be terminated, but that a hearing is not mandated unless
there are factual issues in dispute. Davis, however, insofar as it dealt
with due process, seems to fall short of effective protection for the
tenant because bare short-term notice without the right to confront
the utility in no way enables a tenant to avert an imminent shut-off.
This aspect of Davis belies the entire purpose of "fairness" inherent
in due process:
Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard;
and in order
that they may enjoy that right they must first be
75
notified.

As has been demonstrated, a tenant has substantial rightsboth proprietary and contractual-which are worthy of protection.
By receiving notice, a tenant would perhaps be able, together with
other tenants, to pay the utility bill or to seek restraints against either
the landlord or the utility. If afforded the opportunity to be heard, a
tenant could present his plight to the utility with the hope of
achieving an equitable settlement of the matter. It is only when the
tenant has had both notice and opportunity to be heard that
"substantively unfair and simply mistaken deprivations of property
interests can be prevented. ' 6
Equal Protection

An equal protection problem may arise in the landlordtenant-utility dilemma when the utility refuses to institute service
in the name of the tenant until the tenant pays the landlord's past
due bill for the tenant's apartment. An underlying notion of equal
protection is that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike
in the eyes of the law. 77 The problem in the instant analysis would
11 Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (I Wall.) 223, 233 (1863). Accord, Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S.
67, 80 (1972).
76 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 81 (1972). The entire statement of the Court in this
regard marks a cogent analysis of the importance of procedural due process:
The requirement of notice and an opportunity to be heard raises no impenetrable barrier to the taking of a person's possessions. But the fair process of decisionmaking that it guarantees works, by itself, to protect against arbitrary deprivation of
property. For when a person has an opportunity to speak up in his own defense, and
when the State must listen to what he has to say, substantively unfair and simply
mistaken deprivations of property interests can be prevented. It has long been recognized that "fairness can rarely be obtained by secret, one-sided determination of facts
decisive of rights.... [And n]o better instrument has been devised for arriving at truth
than to give a person in jeopardy of serious loss notice of the case against him and
opportunity to meet it."
Id. (quoting from Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 170-72 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
"' See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971).
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arise when the utility refuses the existing tenant, but would not
refuse a new tenant. This equal protection issue was raised in Davis
v. Weir. 7 8 In setting up the equal protection problem, the court
noted that "[w]ith everything else equal," the municipality would
accept the application of one person who was not indebted to the
city and reject the application of another, likewise not indebted,
solely because in the latter instance a debt is owed by a third party for
past services to the apartment. 79 The benefit thus conferred on one
class of persons was denied to another similarly situated class, without
a rational basis for the distinction. s In rendering its decision, the
court rejected the municipality's contention
that the outstanding debt is so inextricably tied to the premises
that its existence prevents the person occupying the premises,
who is not liable for the debt, from obtaining water service."'
Thus, in a situation where the utility could bill the tenant for
service in his own name, a failure to do so simply because of the
default in payment by the landlord may raise serious equal protection problems. Because a prerequisite for the application of equal
protection is a duality of classes, however, the equal protection
aspect of Davis may be severely limited by the character of the
housing market in a given area. While the Davis argument works in
a situation involving a multi-family house or a small apartment,
either of which is likely to have separate meters for each tenant,
the situation is somewhat different in a multi-story, multi-family
apartment building which has only one meter for all of the units.
Under such circumstances, the utility can quite convincingly argue
that it is unreasonable to allow one tenant to have service in his own
name because it would be impossible to determine that tenant's pro
rata share. In such a case, the tenant may have to rely on due process.
New Jersey Constitution
Under the New Jersey constitution, every citizen is entitled to
have certain natural and unalienable rights, among which are
those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring,
78 328 F. Supp. 317, 322 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
79

Id.

1o Id. The court stated:
In such circumstances, the City is conferring a benefit on one class of persons but does
not confer the same benefit on another, similarly situated class of persons, and there
appears to be nojustification for considering that distinction to be a rational classification.
Id. (footnote omitted).
11 Id. at 323. Accordingly, the court restrained the municipality from refusing to contract
with the tenant. Id.
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possessing, and protecting property, and of pursuing and obtain82
ing safety and happiness.
This article is part of New Jersey's state bill of rights, the whole of
which "is widely recognized as the most forward-looking document
of its kind in the Nation. '83 It is clear that the provisions of article
1, section 1 are not identical to the analogous provisions of the
fourteenth amendment of the federal constitution.8 4 Thus, the
New Jersey supreme court has recognized that:
Conceivably a State Constitution could be more demanding. For
one thing, there is absent the principle of federalism which
cautions against too expansive a view of a federal constitutional
limitation upon the power and opportunity of the several States
to cope with their own problems in the light of their own circumstances. 85
This concept was expanded by Justice Pashman, dissenting in
King v. South Jersey National Bank. 86 Noting that it is the concept of
federalism that places a state action requirement in federal due
process, Justice Pashman explained that one of the central purposes of a state constitution is to fill the gaps of the federal standard by protecting "citizens against private oppression as well as
oppression by the state. ' 87 Although this minority view has substantial basis in scholarly thought,8 8 it was not adopted by the remainder of the court in King. The majority indicated that article 1,
section 1 of the state constitution is operative in this context only
where a citizen's "fundamental" rights have been violated.8 9
Clearly, a tenant deprived of all electric and gas service suffers
a substantial deprivation of the use and enjoyment of the dwelling
unit. If the fundamental right theory of King is applied to this situation, the tenant may come within the protection afforded by the state
82
83

N.J. CONST. art. 1, § 1 (1971).
Milmed, The New Jersey Constitution of 1947, in N.J.

STAT. ANN. CONST. ARTS.

I TO III, at

91, 110 (1971).
94 In Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 902 (1973), the
court considered a challenge to school financing in New Jersey on both federal and state
constitutional grounds. See 62 N.J. at 480, 490, 303 A.2d at 276, 281-82.
8" Id. at 490, 303 A.2d at 282.
86

66 N.J. 161, 330 A.2d 1 (1974).

87 Id. at 193, 330 A.2d at 18 (Pashman, J., dissenting). Justice Pashman indicated that,

under the state constitution, citizens have been constitutionally protected from even wholly
private conduct. Id.
88 Justice Pashman's dissent cites several commentators who share this view of the
constitution. See, e.g., Countryman, The Role of a Bill of Rights in a Modern State Constitution,45
WASH. L. REV. 453 (1970); Note, Toward an Activist Role for State Bills of Rights, 8 HARV. CIv.
RIGHTS-CIV. LIB. L. REV. 271 (1973).
89 See 66 N.J. at 178, 330 A.2d at 10.
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constitution. In the recent decision of Southern Burlington County
N.A.A.C.P. v Township of Mt. Laurel,90 the court, while not directly
so holding, clearly indicated an intent to find that safe and decent
housing is a fundamental right.9 1 Likewise, a 1973 decision by
Justice Pashman, then in the law division, while not binding on
today's court, is indicative of the thinking of one of the current
justices. In Apartment House Council v. Mayor and Council of the
Borough of Ridgefield, 92 then Judge Pashman stated:
With more than one-third of our population living in
apartments and other rental housing and one's home being the
heart of privacy in America, the law cannot be so helpless that an
immediate effort could not be made in the interest of proper and
safe shelter. The dignity of every human being demands a right to be

housed. It is an affront to the dignity
of that human to provide indecent
93
housing even for a short spell.

The supreme court has also measured the activities of public
utilities by New Jersey constitutional standards. At the very least,
the court has viewed the board of public utility commissioners as a
rule-making agent of the state legislature.9 4 Decisions of the court
have also intimated that action by the board is state action, 95 which
is controlled in part by due process requirements.9 6 In one case,
J0 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975).
91 The court noted that constitutional protection "is confined to major questions of fun-

damental import." Id. at 175, 336 A.2d at 725. The decision then went on to say:
We consider the basic importance of housing and local regulations restricting its
availability to substantial segments of the population to fall within [this] category.
Id. It should be noted that housing has been denied the status of a "fundamental" right under
the federal equal protection clause. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972).
9 123 N.J. Super. 87, 301 A.2d 484 (L. Div. 1973),affd, 128 N.J. Super. 192, 319 A.2d 507
(App. Div. 1974). In thiscase, a group of landlords (the council) challenged the constitutionality
of a borough ordinance which required the landlords to deposit security with a municipal
commission. 123 N.J. Super. at 89, 301 A.2d at 485. This money could then be used to make
emergency repairs to an apartment in situations in which the landlord had neglected to do so
after 24 hours' notice. See id. at 89-90, 301 A.2d at 485.
13 123 N.J. Super. at 94-95, 301 A.2d at 488 (emphasis added). After hearing all of the
constitutional arguments, the court held the ordinance constitutional. Id. at 103, 301 A.2d at
493.
14
InCentral R.R. v. Departmentof Pub. Util., 7 N.J. 247,257,81 A.2d 162,166(1951), the
court stated:
It is clear that the Board [of Public Utilities Commissioners], an administrative
body, acts as a legislative agency of the State in the exercise of its rate making powers.
See also Public Serv. Coordinated Transp. Co. v. State, 5 N.J. 196,214, 74 A.2d 580, 589 (1950).
91 In Central R.R. v. Board of Pub. Util. Comm'rs, 10 N.J. 255, 90 A.2d 1 (1952), appeal
dismissed, 345 U.S. 931 (1953), a railroad appealed from a fare decision by the Board. In
analyzing the railroad's arguments regarding the Board decision, the court spoke of "the state
action under review." 10 N.J. at 265, 90 A.2d at 5-6. While the statement is somewhat out of
context, it is indicative.
96 See, e.g., New Jersey Bell Tel. Co. v. Board of Pub. Util. Comm'rs, 12 N.J. 568, 584, 97
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Pennsylvania-ReadingSeashore Lines v. Board of Public Utility Commissioners, 97 a railroad, which had proposed to discontinue service
over a certain run because of severe economic losses, 98 was ordered by the board to continue operating the trains. 99 The supreme court, in reversing the board's decision, 10 0 set out certain
guidelines for the determination of whether a particular service
should be continued." 1 If those guidelines were not followed by
the board, noted the court, its decision
would constitute an arbitrary and unreasonable taking of property for private purposes and without compensation, a violation
of the "due process" provisions of our State and Federal Constitutions. 102
From these decisions, it would appear that a tenant's best
chance for success against utility discontinuance may lie within the
framework of the New Jersey constitution. Cases decided under
that document, while not directly on point, offer ample basis for an
ultimate holding that housing is a fundamental right deserving of
constitutional protection and that the board of public utility commissioners, as an agent of the state legislature, is required to meet
the minimal due process safeguards of notice and the opportunity
to be heard.
A

SUGGESTED SOLUTION

Any effective remedy to the tenant's utility shut-off problem
must accomplish several objectives. It must first restore utility service to the tenant. Second, it must provide a method for payment
of future bills which is equitable to the utility, the tenant, and the
landlord. Third, it must provide a method by which the utility can
attempt to recoup some of the loss suffered by the landlord's
refusal to pay.
Since the service-customer relationship between the utility and
A.2d 602, 610 (1953), wherein the Board denied the company a rehearing on a rate hike. The
court indicated that "[a] rehearing is not essential to due process of law." Id. at 580, 97 A.2d at
608.
" 5 N.J. 114, 74 A.2d 265 (1950).
98 Id. at 117, 74 A.2d at 266. The evidence indicated that the daily passenger use for the
two lines which the railroad wished to discontinue averaged 6.2 and 8.1 and that revenues for
the two lines over an eight month period were $767.13 while costs were $9,262.28. Id.
19 Id. at 118, 74 A.2d at 267. The Board felt bound to do so based on a prior decision. Id.
"I0 Id. at 131, 74 A.2d at 274.
101 Id. at 129, 74 A.2d at 272.
102 Id. The type of due process here referred to, of course, is substantive, while that needed
in utility shut-off cases is procedural.
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the landlord is a contractual one, it is clear that the utility can sue the
defaulting landlord on that contract for the money which is owing to
it, thus collecting on some, if not all, of the arrearages.
In fashioning a workable remedy for maintaining utility service
and for equitably distributing the cost, it is essential to recognize that
at the foundation of any solution should be due process. Unless the
tenant knows the landlord has defaulted and has the opportunity to
protect both property and contract rights, any remedy
is likely to be too late. Once due process is accepted as requisite in
this situation, the remedy will to a great extent depend on the size of
the apartment structure.
In a small building which has either separate meters or where the
tenants have a close relationship, the most viable remedy would
appear to be the one fashioned in Davis v. Weir, 10 3 wherein the court
allowed the tenant to assume service in his own name. 10 4 This continues the service, pays the utility company, and allows the utility
some recourse for recovering the remainder of the debt in a contract
suit. Finally, the landlord would receive rent, although the tenant
would probably be allowed to deduct the utility cost from that which
he pays to the landlord under the doctrine of Marini v. Ireland.'°5
Under this theory, because all parties have received notice of the
intended shut-off, they will suffer only slightly.
In New Jersey, this solution may become obligatory upon all
public utilities. Because of the critical importance of utility service,
the Division of Public Interest Advocacy has petitioned for several
amendments to the New Jersey Administrative Code relative to the
discontinuance of utility service.10 6 Under the enabling legislation
creating his office, the public advocate has the power to commence
"proceedings before any .

.

. board of the State leading to an ...

rule."'0 1 7

administrative
In his petition, the public advocate has alleged that current utility "regulations work undue hardships in many
cases,"'10 and, therefore, has proposed several changes in utility
regulations. For poor tenants, the most important of these proposed regulations reads as follows:
103

328 F. Supp. 317 (N.D. Ga. 1971).

04 Id. at 323. This was based on the court's determination that a failure to allow this

remedy would be violative of equal protection. Id.
105 56 N.J. 130, 146-47, 265 A.2d 526, 535 (1970).
106 Petition, In re Proposed Amendments to the Board's Rules and Regulations Respecting
Discontinuance and Deposits, No. 7411-803 (N.J. Bd. Pub. Util. Comm'rs, filed Nov. 7, 1974)
[hereinafter cited as Petition].
1"7 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27E-32a (Supp. 1975-76).
108

Petition, supra note 106, at 2.
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Notwithstanding any of the other provisions contained in this
section, discontinuance of residential service is prohibited if,
... Service is supplied to a tenant and billed to his landlord,
unless the landlord supplied a statement that the premises are
unoccupied; or, if occupied, a statement under oath signed by
the occupant agreeing to termination; or the utility shall have
offered the tenant continued service to be billed to the tenant,
unless the utility demonstrates that such billing is unfeasible.
However, continued service to a tenant shall not be conditioned upon payment by the tenant of any outstanding bills
due upon the account of any other person. 10 9
While it would seem that these new regulations would provide a
reasonable solution in many instances and should, therefore, be
adopted, it is likewise clear that the public advocate's proposal may be
impossible to enforce in larger buildings with many units and only
one meter.
The solution in this kind of building may lie in some type of
receivership action, either by the tenants individually or by the tenants as the third-party beneficiaries of the contract between the landlord and the utility.11 0 Under the tenant's receivership act,1 1 t the
tenants of a multi-family building could, through a petition alleging
defects in habitability, have a receiver appointed to collect rents." 2
There appears to be no substantive reason why a court could not say
that a lack of utility service affects habitability in such a manner that a
receiver should be appointed to collect the rents, pay the utility for
t 3
the current month, and turn over the excess to the landlord."
Again, the utility could proceed in a contract action against the
landlord for the past due bill.
In addition, it may well be that many owners of multi-story,
multi-family apartment buildings are corporations. In that instance,
the corporate landlord's failure to pay the utility is probably attributable to the corporation's near insolvency. Thus, proceeding to maintain utility service is likely to alleviate only part of the problem since
109 Proposed regulations as annexed to Petition, supra note 106. If enacted, these
regulations would become N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 14:3-3.6(c).
"l See notes 53-69 supra and accompanying text.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:42-85 et seq. (Supp. 1975-76).
112 Id.
§ 2A:42-85. As the legislature found:
It is necessary, in order to insure the improvement of substandard dwelling
units, to authorize the tenants dwelling therein to deposit their rents with a court
appointed administrator until such dwelling units satisfy minimum standards of
safety and sanitation.
Id. § 2A:42-85c.
"' The act specifically mentions as one of the grounds for the appointment of an
administrator "a lack of heat or of running water or of light or electricity." Id. § 2A:42-90(a).
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the corporation has probably also failed to pay other debts. In that
case, the tenant's only remedy is a petition to have the corporation
placed in state receivership. 1 4 To do this, the tenant must first allege
that he is a creditor."15 However, since as third-party beneficiary to
the landlord-utility contract the tenant has all the rights to the enforcement of the contract, the tenant could use his status to assert the
creditor rights of the utility. If this were done, a receiver would be
appointed to in effect stand in the shoes of the landlord and make
new contracts regarding the building. It would thus be possible for
the receiver to pay the monthly bills, including the utility bill, out of
the rents received for the corporation, 1 6 applying the remainder of
monies collected to a pro rata distribution among the creditors for
past debts.''

7

It should be noted that in both of these receivership actions, the
rent receiver, as the court-appointed rent collector, would have
standing to dispossess any tenant who failed to meet rental commitments.'

18
CONCLUSION

In a modern context, courts are evaluating the law of landlord
and tenant more and more under contract, rather than property,
principles." 9 But even standard contract remedies have often proved
114 The placing of a corporation into receivership is controlled by statute. See id. §
14A:14-1 et seq. (1969).
ld. § 14A:14-2 provides, in part, that:
I.
(1) A receivership action may be brought in the Superior Court by
(a) a creditor whose claim is for a sum certain or for a sum which can ... be
made certain ....
"Creditor" is defined by the act as a "holder of any claim, of whatever character, against a
corporation." Id. § 14A:14-1(b) (emphasis added). To be entitled to relief, the action must be
based on one of the following: insolvency of the corporation; suspension of business of the
corporation due to lack of funds; or great prejudice to creditors or stockholders because of
severe losses currently being suffered by the corporation. Id. § 14A:14-2(2).
"' Subject to court supervision, the reciever has the power to
continue the business of the corporation, and, to that end, enter into contracts,
borrow money, pledge, mortgage or otherwise encumber the property of the
corporation as security for the repayment of the receiver's loans ....
Id. § 14A:14-5(g).
I'7 Creditors are generally paid in proportion to the amount of their debt after certain
expenses are deducted from the assets of the corporation. See id. § 14A: 14-21.
118 Compareid. § 14A: 14-5(b), which allows the receiver to "institute ... actions.., on behalf
of the corporation" with id. § 2A:42-92(b) (Supp. 1975-76), which directs that, in a rent receiver
action, all rents to become due are to be paid into court, and that any attempt by the landlord
to collect said rents is void.
119 See Javins v. First Nat. Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1075 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 925 (1970). See generally Note, Landlord'sImplied Warranty of HabitabilityDoes Not Give Rise
to Strict Tort Liabilityfor Tenant's PersonalInjuries, 5 SETON HALL L. REV. 409, 416-21 (1974).
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inadequate. This is the case in the utility shut-off situation inasmuch
as the contract remedy of damages clearly will not restore utility
service. Neither will the remedies of rescission, if the tenant has no
place to go, or specific performance, if the landlord simply cannot pay
the bill. It is likewise clear that a tenant deserves to have the benefit of
utility service where it is part of the lease contract. Because of the
importance of utility service to the residential tenant, its continuation
deserves the protection of more than just standard contract or property remedies. The nature of the relief may require that the problem
assume federal or state constitutional dimensions.
What is also evident is that the remedy must inure to the benefit
of the tenant in the form of immediate restoration of utility service
and still provide the utility with a mechanism for obtaining payment.
The solutions suggested above are means by which a modern court
can provide the tenant with contracted-for essential services, thus
striking an equitable balance in landlord-tenant-utility relations.
James R. Devine

